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The process of deporting non-citizens is subject to judicial review under several fields of
public law. These fields—criminal law, constitutional law, and administrative law—arc
towards the protection of the individual. And yet, a series of judicial interpretations place
deportees on the margins of that otherwise protective arc. This marginalization is principally
explained by the relationships between the fields: The “webbing” of public law joins the fields
of criminal law, constitutional law, and administrative law together. Reading deportation
cases laterally across these fields reveals that they function as mutual referents for one
another, providing assurance that some other field will offer legal cover for the deportee,
and buttressing the persistent divide between immigration law and other fields of public law.
After examining the webbing as an intervening register in public law theory and practice, the
article explores the judicial doctrine of deportation in each field and traces the content of the
webbing between them.
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DEPORTATION MATTERS EXIST AT SOME REMOVE from mainstream public law.

This distance has been affected by a series of judicial decisions emanating from
various fields of public law. In this article, I examine those judicial decisions
to illuminate the connections they make between the fields of public law.
My argument is that the fields of public law are related and often work together
in deportation law. The cases reveal that the fields of public law function as
mutual referents for one another, providing assurance to the judiciary that some
other field of public law will provide legal cover for the individual and shoring
up the dictum that deportation, and immigration more generally, are distinct
from other fields of public law. These assurances truncate the role of public law
in immigration and deportation matters.
The process of deportation from Canada, from an administrative decision
to physical removal, is subject to judicial review under several bodies of law.
These fields of law—criminal law, constitutional law, and administrative law—
are fields of public law. In each of these fields, public law theory and practice
arc towards the protection of the individual. Criminal law contains several due
process protections because of the risk to liberty and security posed by arrest
and imprisonment. Constitutional law upholds a range of rights to further
the values of liberty, equality, and human dignity. Administrative law provides
access to justice through “governments in miniature” and fairness in delegated
decision making.1 And yet, in deportation matters, a series of exceptional judicial

1.

R Blake Brown, “The Canadian Legal Realists and Administrative Law Scholarship,
1930-41” (2000) 9 Dal J Leg Stud 36 at 50; Mary Liston, “Governments in Miniature: The
Rule of Law in the Administrative State” [Liston, “Governments”] in Colleen M Flood &
Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed (Emond Montgomery, 2013) 39.

Kaushal, The

Webbing of Public Law 293

interpretations place individuals subject to deportation on the margins of this
otherwise protective arc.2
The laws and practices of deportation operate against non-citizens in ways
that would be legally problematic if the deportees were citizens.3 As Daniel
Kanstroom observes, it is possible for people to believe—and for a liberal
democratic state to hold out—that individuals should not be subject “to an
arbitrary, disproportionately harsh system” of law, that punishment should not be
retroactive, that individuals should not be detained indefinitely, and that families
should not be separated, and to have a deportation system that violates all of these
tenets.4 This incongruity occurs through the executive and legislative branches
of government that establish and implement the deportation regime, as well as
through the judicial branch of government that reviews it. This article is focused
on how judicial interpretations produce the incongruity. There are various tensions
present in the deportation jurisprudence, ranging from its strained curtailment
of constitutional rights to its dogged characterization of deportation as distinct
from punishment to its emphasis on negligible administrative remedies. There is
a growing body of excellent scholarship on the curtailment of Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”) protections in the non-citizen context; in this
article, I focus specifically on deportation in the fields of public law and the
relationships between them.5
This judicial landscape was in flux until very recently. In the past fifteen
years, the Supreme Court of Canada has heard more immigration law cases than
in the thirty years before that. In part, this reflects the increasing significance
of immigration law in the twenty-first century, as demographic needs and
2.

3.
4.
5.

Peter Schuck, “The Transformation of Immigration Law” (1984) 84 Colum L Rev 1 at
3; Hiroshi Motomura, “Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation” (1990) 100 Yale LJ 545; Daniel
Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History (Harvard University Press,
2010) [Kanstroom, Deportation Nation]; Daniel Kanstroom, “Deportation, Social Control,
and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases” (2000) 113 Harv
L Rev 1889 [Kanstroom, “Hard Laws”].
Kanstroom, Deportation Nation, supra note 2.
Ibid at 15.
Catherine Dauvergne, “How the Charter has Failed Non-Citizens in Canada: Reviewing
Thirty Years of Supreme Court of Canada Jurisprudence” (2013) 58 McGill LJ 663
[Dauvergne, “Charter Failure”]; Colin Grey, “Thinkable: The Charter and Refugee Law
after Appulonappa and B010” (2016) 76 SCLR 111; Gerald Heckman, “Revisiting the
Application of Section 7 of the Charter in Immigration and Refugee Protection” (2017) 68
UNBLJ 312. For a sustained examination of these relationships in a narrower context, see
David Dyzenhaus, ed, The Unity of Public Law (Hart, 2004).
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xenophobic national security concerns press in contradictory directions on the
borders of the nation state. It is also, however, part of the ongoing judicial effort
to articulate the limits of the state’s immigration law power. Since the earliest
immigration cases, the power of immigration to determine membership in the
political community secured its location near the centre of sovereignty.6 One
recurring leitmotif in these recent cases is the judiciary’s struggle to locate the
limit point between citizens and foreigners: the point at which non-citizen status
may be the primary determinant of the judicial decision.
In the criminal law field, this inquiry has focused on the immigration
consequences of criminal convictions. These cases further cleave deportation
from theoretical criminal justification. In the constitutional law field, non-citizen
status anchors the judicial creation of a curious on/off switch for section 7 of the
Charter in deportation matters. Through a series of decisions that were refused
leave to appeal last year, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that the Charter
is “off” in deportation matters until all administrative safeguards are exhausted.7
This riff on the requirement to exhaust local remedies relies upon circumscribed
statutory safeguard provisions that were not intended to function as constitutional
remedies, which further solidifies the relationship between the fields of public
law. In the administrative law field, non-citizen status determines the measure of
procedural fairness available, the nature of reasonableness in standard of review
decisions, and the weight placed on the availability of administrative remedies,
which is where it has come to rest.8 These cases emanate from different fields of
public law, but they are in dialogue with one another, as are the fields themselves.
In this article, I propose the idea of “webbing” to analyze the relationships
6.

7.

8.

Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2008) [Dauvergne, Making People Illegal]; Schuck, supra
note 2; Mary Bosworth, “Border Control and the Limits of the Sovereign State” (2008) 17
Soc & Leg Stud 199; Juliet Stumpf, “The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power” (2006) 56 Am U L Rev 367.
Moretto v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 71, aff’d 2019 FCA 261, leave
to appeal to SCC refused, 38964 (2 April 2020) [Moretto]; Revell v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 905, aff’d 2019 FCA 262, leave to appeal to SCC
refused, 38891 (2 April 2020) [Revell]; Kreishan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2018 FC 481, aff’d 2019 FCA 223, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 30714 (19
August 2019) [Kreishan].
See Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 SCC 68 [Febles]; B010 v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 58 [B010] (on remedies); Agraira v Canada
(Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36; Kanthasamy v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61 [Kanthasamy] (discussing standard of
review and the role of the certified question).

Kaushal, The

Webbing of Public Law 295

between the individual fields of public law. The webbing of public law is the
connective tissue that links the fields of criminal law, constitutional law, and
administrative law together in particular contexts.
This article is a close yet panoramic reading of gaps and relationships in the
judicial doctrine of deportation in Canada. Part I examines the field of public
law on its own terms. It sets out two of the registers in which public law speaks,
and then it proposes an intervening relational register revealed by the deportation
context. This is the webbing of public law. Parts II through IV examine the three
individual fields of public law from the perspective of deportation law. These
fields—criminal law, constitutional law, and administrative law—are each the
subject of settled, guiding principles that govern judicial interpretation. In the
deportation context, however, these principles are modified and subverted.
Part II explores the criminal law field, focusing on sticky historical precedents
that maintain deportation’s non-criminal, non-penal nature, and analyzing the
recent cases of Pham, Tran, and Wong.9 Part III examines the curtailment of
constitutional law’s doctrinal scope and access to its protections, explaining
the case of Chiarelli and its progeny,10 and indicating what was at stake in the
recent trilogy of Kreishan, Revell, and Moretto.11 Part IV examines the curtailment
of access to constitutional law protections through administrative law and its
statutory safeguards. The picture that emerges is one in which the fields of public
law shunt deportation towards administrative law, which presents applicants with
its own challenging labyrinth of potential remedies. Part V concludes with some
observations about how these relationships attenuate the scope of public law in
deportation matters.

I. THE WEBBING OF PUBLIC LAW
Public law, by nature, comprises more than one field of law. The antecedent of
public law is the base distinction between private law and public law, where public
law comprises those legal fields in which the individual interacts with the state.
The fields of public law have in common the nature and identity of the legal parties
involved: the state and the individual. Contemporary public law “is assumed
to have a distinctive anatomy and can be subdivided into constitutional law,
9.

R v Pham, 2013 SCC 15 [Pham]; Tran v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),
2017 SCC 50 [Tran]; R v Wong, 2018 SCC 25 [Wong].
10. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v Chiarelli, [1992] 1 SCR 711 at
735 [Chiarelli].
11. Kreishan, supra note 7; Revell, supra note 7; Moretto, supra note 7.
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administrative law, civil liberties law, criminal law, revenue law, EU law, and
public international law.”12 The three fields of law that adjudicate deportation
matters—criminal law, constitutional law, and administrative law—are often
considered among the core fields of public law.13 This article focuses on the value
added by looking through public law’s distinctive anatomy to the relationships
between its fields.
It is a well-known but rarely articulated feature of public law that its scholars
communicate in different registers. In this section, I focus on two of those
registers—the higher register and the lower register—and the different public
law concerns contemplated by them. One group of public law scholars focuses on
public law theory, exploring the relationship between public law and its political
environment. As the legal embodiment of the political domain, public law here is
focused on concepts, values, and forms often explored through public law history
and political theory. This is the higher register, concerned with the justification
and limits of law writ large, visible in the scholarship of Martin Loughlin,
David Dyzenhaus, Neil Walker, and others. Meanwhile, there is another group
of public law scholars trained in particular sub-fields of public law. Given the
regulatory and judicial form that public law takes, this lower register is focused
on the principles and outer limits of individual fields. These scholars are less
interested in explaining or justifying the whole and are more attentive to public
law in specific contexts. They are not atheoretical; rather, they are focused on
the principles and frameworks of particular public law settings rather than on its
theory or genealogy. These registers are not hermetic or exclusive. The form and
doctrine of public law have much to tell us about its theory and vice versa, and
many scholars move easily between them.14
By looking at the full legal context of deportation, an intervening register
of public law comes into focus. This medial register comprises the relationships
between public law’s individual fields. Similar to the comparative law undertaking,
this register requires looking across the fields rather than squarely at them or
above them. Public law scholars often miss the connective tissue that joins
the fields because they are focused instead on theorizing its political meaning
or assembling its doctrinal frameworks. The deportation context illuminates
12. Martin Loughlin, “The Nature of Public Law” in Cormac Mac Amhlaigh, Cláudio Michelon
& Neil Walker, eds, After Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 11 at 11.
13. This article focuses on criminal, constitutional, and administrative law as the fields that
operate inside the public law state—the ones that courts apply when judicially reviewing
deportation. International human rights law plays a role, but it has not generated much
traction in the deportation context. See Dauvergne, “Charter Failure,” supra note 5.
14. See e.g. the work of David Dyzenhaus, Mary Liston, and Evan Fox-Decent.
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the webbing because of its significance for the judicial doctrine governing the
deportee. This takes two forms: the horizontal and vertical aspects of the webbing.
The horizontal aspect of the webbing demonstrates how individual subfields may
lead to situations in which claims are shunted towards a particular silo or subfield
of public law. In deportation matters, the connective tissue is what carries the
deportee to the field of administrative law. The vertical aspect of the webbing
reveals the rupture between public law theory and doctrine. In deportation
matters, the connective tissue is the method through which the deportee is placed
at the margins of public law’s theoretical values of equality and the rule of law.
The webbing of public law, in other words, may reveal the limits of the higher
and lower registers of public law, presenting a fuller picture than is visible by
examining either register alone.
The term “public law” in the first register refers to the relationship between
public law and the political domain. James Tully defines public law as “the
basic laws that juridicalise or legalise the distribution, institutionalization and
exercise of the political powers of governing…in any form of legal and political
association.”15 It marries law and governance. Public law as a meta-field on its
own terms has achieved traction in the legal academy because it adds conceptual
range and rigour. The range and rigour come from public law’s distinctive
anatomy, as discussed by Martin Loughlin, which brings politics, government,
and institutions to the surface. Because public law is “in close synergy with its
political environment,” it often finds itself in the crosshairs of constitutional and
political theory.16 The resulting amalgam of public legal fields and their political
scaffolding embodies, or seeks to embody, certain legal values to guide the exercise
of public power. Predictably, the identification and content of these values are
matters of significant debate.17 In their account of the ascendance of modern
public law, Cormac Mac Amhlaigh, Claudio Michelon, and Neil Walker explain:
[Public law] first announced itself against pre-modern forms of political organization
and did so by pushing an agenda predicated upon ideas of political equality (as
opposed to status-centred forms of political organization), sovereignty, state, nation,
15. James Tully, as quoted in Emilios Christodoulidis & Stephen Tierney, eds, Public Law and
Politics: The Scope and Limits of Constitutionalism (Routledge, 2008) at 69 [Christodoulidis &
Tierney, Public Law and Politics].
16. Ibid at 1 (describing Loughlin’s account).
17. See e.g. Vicki Jackson, “Paradigms of Public Law: Transnational Constitutional Values and
Democratic Challenges” (2010) 8 ICON 517; Mattias Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn
in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the
State” in Jeffrey L Dunoff & Joel P Trachtman, eds, Ruling the World? Constitutionalism,
International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 258.
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and constitution. As modern public law conceived of itself as the legal embodiment
of such ideals and forms, and not merely a philosophically sophisticated account of
politics, from the outset it had to assert itself against private law or what was then
simply understood as “the law.”18

Loughlin similarly expounds: “[Public law] was founded on basic ideas of
sovereignty and citizenship and, later, on notions of democracy and rights. It is a
mode of rule that claims to be law (droit)-governed.”19 The theoretical values
referred to in these accounts and others generate agreement in the abstract, but
scholars diverge on precisely which values are implied by public law and the
priority among them. The argument in this article does not depend on the settled
content of public law values; it relies on the a priori existence of those values to
demonstrate the significance of the relationships between the individual fields.
When administrative, constitutional, and criminal law are studied together in the
deportation context, the webbing between them belies several of the theoretical
public law values espoused in the higher register as well as the judicial public law
values articulated in the lower one.
The values of public law take on heightened importance in the deportation
context because of its population of interest. The vast majority of people who
are deported from Canada are racialized, and there are frequently intersecting
considerations related to mental health, addiction, and poverty. The fields of
criminal, constitutional, and administrative law are cautiously grappling with these
social determinants of justice, such as through pre-sentence reports, reasonable
person analysis, equality and discrimination concepts of intersectionality and
harm, and dispute resolution initiatives in administrative settings. The webbing
of deportation doctrine precludes meaningful access to these frameworks of social
justice by holding the deportee between the fields of public law.
Meanwhile, public law in the lower register is concerned with regulation and
doctrine. The values of particular public law fields are invariably specified through
decisions. For example, the content of fairness, the role of constitutional values,
and the extent of state interference upon arrest will differ according to state and
context. Together they cohere to provide a snapshot of the values in specific fields
of public law. In deportation matters, however, knowledge of constitutional and
common law cases and judicial doctrine does not provide interpretative guidance.
18. “Introduction” in Mac Amhlaigh, Michelon & Walker, supra note 12, 1 at 1
[emphasis in original].
19. Emilios Christodoulidis & Stephen Tierney, “Public Law and Politics: Rethinking the
Debate” [Christodoulidis & Tierney, “Rethinking”] in Christodoulidis & Tierney, Public
Law and Politics, supra note 15, 1 at 4 (describing Martin Loughlin’s chapter, “Reflections on
The Idea of Public Law”).
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Instead, the webbing, underwritten by the citizen/non-citizen distinction, holds
these values at bay. It is ultimately the connective tissue between the three fields
that matters. Immigration scholars and lawyers know that administrative law
holds more promise for deportees than constitutional law, but the contours of this
promise, as well as the connections between the fields, require further academic
scrutiny. This article sets out to demonstrate those relationships: showing,
for example, how Charter section 7 engagement is truncated by reference to
statutory administrative safeguards and how the characterization of deportation
as non-punitive withdraws corollary constitutional protections.
The following sections begin with the Supreme Court of Canada cases that
establish the framework from which the Federal Court and Federal Court of
Appeal render their decisions. The vast majority of deportation cases do not reach
the Federal Courts, and concomitantly fewer reach the Supreme Court. In other
words, to spot the divergent lines of authority and the interpretative sticking
points, one must often look to the Federal Court jurisprudence. This case set
is unique because it places the three fields of public law that govern the judicial
review of deportation into conversation.20 What emerges is a repeated judicial
preference for administrative processes over constitutional or criminal ones based
on quite intricate connective rationales between the fields. These interpretations
efface the conception of the state as prosecutor from criminal law and the state
as rights-protector from constitutional law, leaving only the regulatory state from
administrative law to judge deportation.21

II. CRIMINAL LAW
A. DEPORTATION IS NOT PUNISHMENT

Nearly a century ago, deportation was excised from the sphere of criminal law.
In 1924, in the United States, Chief Justice Taft famously opined, “it is well-settled
that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not
punishment.”22 In Canada, in 1933, Chief Justice Duff echoed that deportation
provisions were “not concerned with the penal consequences of the acts of

20. Methodology analysis [on file with the author]. The methodology, in brief, consisted of
searching legal databases for various combinations of terms (e.g., “deportation and liberty”
and “removal and procedural fairness”), reviewing them, and coding the results.
21. I am grateful to Mary Liston for this understanding of the regulatory state.
22. Mahler v Eby, 264 US 32 (1924); Harisiades v Shaughnessy, 342 US 580 (1952), upheld in
Reno v American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 US 471 (1999), Scalia J.
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individuals.”23 The lasting significance of these opinions is the wholesale removal
of deportation from the realm of criminal and penal law. This interpretation
sustains deportation as administrative and civil in nature, removing the need
for criminal due process protections.24 The marginal location of deportation was
then reinforced with the advent of the Charter, as courts relied on the finding that
deportation was not punishment as well as the obiter surrounding it to further
distance deportation from constitutional rights protections. In this section, I trace
this trajectory and explore its implications in an era of so-called crimmigration.
In Reference re Effect of Exercise of Royal Prerogative of Mercy Upon Deportation
Proceedings (“Prerogative of Mercy”), Chief Justice Duff laid the foundations for
deportation’s relationship to punishment. The issue was whether a convict, after
serving their sentence in full or upon early release under an act of clemency, was
then to be removed from the statutory category of “prohibited or undesirable
classes” described in the Immigration Act.25 In reaching the conclusion that such
a convict was not so removed from the category, the Supreme Court observed:
It is, perhaps, almost unnecessary to observe that the group of sections under
consideration is not concerned with the penal consequences of the acts of individuals.
They are designed to afford to this country some protection against the presence
here of classes of aliens who are referred to in the statute as “undesirable.”
Moreover, the results which follow from proceedings under s. 42 are not attached
to the criminal offence as a legal consequence following de jure upon conviction for
the offence or imposable therefor at the discretion of a judicial tribunal. They follow,
if they follow at all, as the result of an administrative proceeding initiated at the
discretion of the Minister at the head of the Department of Immigration.26

The significance of this analysis lies in its abrogation of Lee v. The King (“Lee”),
a Supreme Court case from seven years earlier, without ever directly addressing
it. This abrogation has come to structure deportation’s relationship with criminal
23. Reference re Effect of Exercise of Royal Prerogative of Mercy Upon Deportation Proceedings,
[1933] SCR 269 at 278 [Royal Prerogative of Mercy]. For a longer historical view, see
William Walters, “Deportation, Expulsion, and the International Police of Aliens” (2002)
6 Citizenship Studies 267; Audrey Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have
Rights, and the Production of the Alien” (2014) 40 Queen’s LJ 1 (discussing banishment).
24. Stumpf, supra note 6; Kanstroom, “Hard Laws,” supra note 2. There is a large body of
scholarship concerning the plenary power doctrine in the United States, which governs, inter
alia, the relationship between deportation and the Constitution. While that scholarship
informed the trajectory of this article, this article is concerned with the Canadian contours of
deportation and, in criminal and penal contexts, with the concept of punishment.
25. Royal Prerogative of Mercy, supra note 23 at 269; Immigration Act, RSC 1927, c 93.
26. Royal Prerogative of Mercy, supra note 23 at 278 [emphasis added].
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law in much the same way that the Chiarelli decision has come to structure
deportation’s relationship with constitutional law.
Prerogative of Mercy confirmed that deportation was an administrative
proceeding insulated from penal consequences, and it would later form the
backbone of the more specific finding that deportation is not punishment.
However, Chief Justice Duff equivocated on the nature of the relationship
between the criminal conviction and deportation, hesitating to draw a direct
line. Seven years earlier, the Supreme Court had decided this relationship in Lee.
At issue in Lee was an exception in the 1906 Supreme Court Act that precluded the
Court from exercising jurisdiction in “proceedings for or upon a writ of habeas
corpus…arising out of a criminal charge.”27 Lee challenged his detention prior to
deportation under habeas corpus. The Supreme Court found a clear and direct
relationship between the criminal conviction and deportation, noting that the
Immigration Act subjected him to deportation “as a result of his conviction and,
therefore, as something directly flowing from the judicial finding of his guilt of
the criminal charge laid against him.… It is impossible to say that the custody
and deportation…do not ‘arise out of the criminal charge’ of which the alien
was convicted.”28 The result did not favour Lee, whose habeas application was
thus within the exception to the Court’s jurisdiction. The decision nonetheless
established deportation as a direct consequence of a criminal conviction,
opening the door to the possibility that it might warrant criminal protections.
In Prerogative of Mercy, however, Chief Justice Duff found that deportation was
an indirect consequence of a criminal conviction. The use of immigration law
to trigger deportation constituted an intervening administrative proceeding that
changed its source and also its nature.
The issue then laid more or less dormant until after the advent of the Charter
in 1982.29 In 1992, in Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v.
Chiarelli (“Chiarelli”), the doctrinal anchor of subsequent deportation cases, the
Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Court of Appeal below that “deportation

27. Supreme Court Act, RSC 1906, c 139, s 36.
28. Lee v The King, [1926] SCR 652 at 654.
29. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 8-9, 11, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
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is not imposed as punishment,” citing Prerogative of Mercy.30 Justice Sopinka
conceded that it could come within the scope of treatment, but he did not decide
this point because the deportation was not, in his view, cruel and unusual.31
One year later, in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (“Rodriguez”),
Justice Sopinka elaborated on his decision in Chiarelli:
While the deportation order in Chiarelli was not penal in nature as it did not result
from any particular offence having been committed, it was nonetheless imposed by
the state in the context of enforcing a state administrative structure—in that case,
the immigration system and its body of regulation. The respondent Chiarelli in
that case, who had not complied with the requirements imposed by the regulatory
scheme, was dealt with in accordance with the precepts of the administrative system.32

This paragraph is a double-edged sword for deportation: On the one hand, it is an
effort to extend the application of “treatment” within the meaning of section 12
to administrative contexts.33 On the other hand, it is limiting because it secures
deportation as an administrative decision separate and apart from the penal and
even quasi-penal context—and this is indeed the interpretation that has been
carried forward in the case law. Ultimately, the statutory availability of a fair
assessment procedure mitigated the possibility of cruel and unusual treatment,
which has come to play little role outside of the refugee context.34
Deportation’s ouster from the criminal and penal contexts is challenging
on its own terms, but the challenge is heightened by the growing imbrication
of criminal law and constitutional law. So deep is this imbrication that criminal
law is arguably “now best understood and approached as a species of the
30. Chiarelli, supra note 10, citing Hoang v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)
(1990), 13 Imm LR (2d) 35 (FCA) at 41 (stating that “deportation…is not to be
conceptualized as a deprivation of liberty or punishment”); Hurd v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1988] FCJ No 945 (FCA). For the most recent iteration,
see Tran v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 SCC 50 [Tran]. For
punishment under security of the person, see Singh v Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1985] 1 SCR 177 at 207 [Singh].
31. Chiarelli, supra note 10 at 715.
32. Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519 at 610 [Rodriguez].
33. Ibid.
34. For case law showing that section 12 plays no significant role outside of the refugee context,
and that section 12 claims are typically precluded by a risk assessment, see Canepa v Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 3 FC 270; Barrera v Canada (Minister
of Employment & Immigration), [1992] FCJ No 1127; Sinnappu v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 2 FC 791 (dismissed for mootness); Arduengo v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 3 FC 468; Mohammed v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 3 FC 299; Solis v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2000] FCJ No 407, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2000] SCCA No 249.
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constitutional.”35 This is perceivable through the lens of the Charter and its
approach to legal rights: Characterizing deportation as administrative in nature
withdrew access to most of the legal rights enumerated in sections 7 to 14. These
legal rights are among the most important for the integrity of the criminal law
process; they include freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, the right not
to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned, and the right to general due process.36
Moreover, as explored in Part II(B), below, since the rights in sections 8 through
14 are considered illustrative of the rights protected by section 7, deportees’
inability to access them significantly impedes their ingress to section 7 rights.37
The difficulties of excising the deportation process (which in many respects
closely resembles the criminal process and typically follows from its application)
are mounting. The doctrinal foundations of this excision rest on judicial tenets
established nearly one hundred years ago about the administrative (and therefore
non-penal) nature of deportation. Chiarelli intervened in 1992, but only to
further buttress these precedents and renovate them for a post-Charter context.
The problems presented by this dated jurisprudence are becoming acute in an era
of crimmigration. Crimmigration refers to the convergence between criminal law
and immigration law. Writing about the United States, Juliet Stumpf detailed the
substantive overlap of immigration law and criminal law, the similar enforcement
methods for immigration and criminal violations, and the procedural
commonality for prosecuting immigration and criminal violations.38 In both
the United States and Canada, immigration law was morphing from a primarily
administrative civil process overseen by a government department charged with
labour and employment matters into a criminalized process of warrants, arrests,
and detention overseen by an agency closely resembling a police force.
The trouble is that the growing parallels and intersections between the fields
do not track corollary constitutional or procedural protections. Twenty years
ago, Kanstroom explained the correspondence between deportation and criminal
punishment. Looking through the lens of criminal law theory, he observed their
shared justifications: punishment, incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution.39
He then argued that such state acts would, in any other context, attract
constitutional protection.
35. Benjamin Berger, “Constitutional Principles” in Markus D Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle, eds,
The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 423 at 423.
36. Charter, supra note 29, ss 7-14.
37. R v Swain, [1991] 1 SCR 933 at 1008-1013 [Swain]. Section 7 is examined in the next Part.
38. Stumpf, supra note 6 at 378 (describing the United States but Canada has followed a
similar trajectory).
39. “Hard Laws,” supra note 2 at 1893-94.
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That [deportation] proceedings are initiated by a government enforcement
agency, are directly based on criminal conduct, involve incarceration and forced
movement of persons, and may result in lifetime banishment supports the logic of
this assumption.40

Yet, despite these shared characteristics, immigration law has enfolded several
prohibitions of criminal law but none of its procedural ballasts. This divergence
in protection is based on the status of the non-citizen. As Sharryn Aiken, David
Lyon, and Malcolm Thorburn observe:
[I]t is no great exaggeration to say that there are now two criminal laws at work: one
for non-citizens (which includes a host of immigration offences that do not apply
to citizens, as well as deportation as a further response to crime for which citizens
are not liable) and another for citizens (who are subject neither to these additional
offences nor these additional responses to crime).41

There are three primary sites of intersection between criminal law and
immigration law.42 First, commission or conviction of crimes attract
immigration-related consequences. The statutory inadmissibility provisions
of immigration law directly refer to the Criminal Code for types of offences,
listed offences, and sentencing limits.43 The immigration consequences for more
serious crimes typically eliminate rights of appeal and require deportation.44
Second, immigration violations carry criminal consequences. These enforcement
provisions criminalize entry in cases of smuggling or trafficking, offences relating
to documents (typically, fraudulent identity documents), misrepresentation,
and a catch-all provision: “any contravention of the Act that does not specify
a penalty.”45 Some of these contraventions reappear in the Criminal Code; all
of them attach criminal forms and punishments to immigration acts. Third,
features of the criminal law’s enforcement apparatus are brought to bear in
immigration matters. The statutory regime for deportation authorizes a detailed
40. Ibid at 1894.
41. “Introduction: ‘Crimmigration, Surveillance and Security Threats’: A Multidisciplinary
Dialogue” (2014) 40 Queen’s LJ i at iii.
42. César García Hernández, “Deconstructing Crimmigration” (2018) 52 UC Davis L
Rev 197 at 210.
43. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, ss 36-37 [IRPA] (among
other provisions).
44. Ibid, ss 68(4), 34-37, read in conjunction with Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations, SOR/2002-227, ss 227-29 [IRPR].
45. IRPA, supra note 43, ss 117-29. Section 124 is the catch-all provision. Some of these
provisions appear in the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. See IRPA, supra note 43, ss 183
(human trafficking, counselling misrepresentation), 279.03 (document destruction). While
these provisions are comparatively rarely used, their potential application is vast.
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system of warrants and arrests, detention, detention reviews, and physical
restraints, including handcuffs.46 Although the federal government recently built
new immigration detention centers, deportees may still be held in provincial
jails, underlining that immigration detention is not only analogous to penal
detention—it is often identical.47 Crimmigration raises several concerns in its
own right, but those concerns are heightened by judicial reliance on precedent to
keep deportation and criminal law as far apart as possible.48
B. CRIMINAL LAW AND IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES: WONG, PHAM,
AND TRAN

The first axis of convergence—more crimes carrying immigration consequences—
culminated in a trio of Supreme Court of Canada cases about the relationship
between criminal sentences and immigration consequences: Wong, Pham, and
Tran. None of the cases raised constitutional claims. The cases required the Court
to reckon with the nature of deportation as a collateral consequence of a criminal
conviction—an area where the link between criminal law and immigration law
is evident. All three judgments struggled to contain non-citizen status in the
sphere of immigration law, highlighting the conceptual difficulty of denying
that deportation often follows directly from a criminal conviction and that
deportation is punishment.
In R. v. Pham (“Pham”), the Supreme Court addressed the role of collateral
immigration consequences in criminal sentencing.49 Pham was convicted of
producing and trafficking marijuana and received a prison term of two years.
Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”), a two-year prison
sentence removes the right to appeal a removal order. Pham’s conviction would
have necessarily triggered a removal order against him, making his right to appeal
crucial to his efforts to remain. The Court agreed to reduce the sentence to two
years less a day, but only because the Crown conceded it would have agreed to the
reduction. In its analysis, the Court explained that collateral consequences may
be relevant to the individualization of the sentence, the principle of parity, and

46. IRPA, supra note 43, ss 54-87; IRPR, supra note 44, ss 223-51. See also Immigration,
Refugees and Citizenship Canada, ENF 10 Removals (IRCC, 24 February 2017), s 10, online
(pdf ): <www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/resources/manuals/enf/
enf10-eng.pdf> [ENF 10].
47. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Chhina, 2019 SCC 29 [Chhina].
48. “Preface” in Katja Franko Aas & Mary Bosworth, eds, The Borders of Punishment: Migration,
Citizenship, and Social Exclusion (Oxford University Press, 2013) vii.
49. Pham, supra note 9.
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rehabilitation analysis.50 Citing The Law of Sentencing by Allan Manson, Justice
Wagner explained:
The mitigating effect of indirect consequences must be considered in relation to
future re-integration and to the nature of the offence. Burdens and hardships flowing
from a conviction are relevant if they make the rehabilitative path harder to travel.51

But, he cautioned, “these consequences must not be allowed to dominate the
exercise or skew the process either in favour of or against deportation.”52 The
problem with this analysis is that deportation is different in kind to the other
factors or inputs that go into sentencing. Deportation removes the possibility
of rehabilitation, future integration, or living productively in the community.
The failure to consider deportation as a global or meta factor takes away the
strength of the reason for modifying the sentence in the first place; it renders
superficial the inquiries into individualization and rehabilitation. Moreover,
to place deportation on par with the other relevant factors for sentencing
ignores the nexus between IRPA and the Criminal Code—a nexus made real by
crimmigration. Deportation is the direct downstream effect of sentencing. Pham
tries to foreclose this connection by aligning deportation with other collateral
consequences, despite their obvious differences.
Four years later, in Tran v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness)
(“Tran”), the Supreme Court decided that conditional sentences were not
included in a “term of imprisonment” under IRPA.53 Justice Côté also had to
make a temporality determination: which “maximum term of imprisonment”
to use, where that maximum term had varied over time. In her discussion of
IRPA’s objectives, she emphasized its similarity to the criminal law context:
The fundamental duty of justice requires the state to recognise certain rights of
individuals in its dealings with them; notably, in the sphere of criminal law, the state
should respect the rule of law and the principle of legality, so that citizens as rational
agents may plan their lives so as to avoid criminal conviction.54

This description, wrote Justice Côté, is “apposite in the immigration law context.”55
This is an expansive vision for immigration law, one that folds immigrants into the
circle of criminal law and its core understanding of the relationship between the
state and its citizens. For this brief moment, permanent residents could equally
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Ibid at para 10.
Ibid at para 12; Allan Manson, The Law of Sentencing (Irwin Law, 2001) at 137.
Pham, supra note 9 at para 16.
Tran, supra note 9.
Ibid at para 41.
Ibid.
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expect their obligations to be “knowable” and communicated to them in advance,
as part of the same bargain between citizens and the state.56 And yet, despite the
Court’s analogy between immigration and criminal prohibitions, it nonetheless
opted to anchor the rule against retrospectivity in criminal inadmissibility in
common law statutory interpretation rather than in section 11(i) of the Charter.57
This interpretation provides weaker protection against retrospective application
than one acknowledging deportation as a criminal or penal matter.
Then, in 2018, the Supreme Court heard R. v. Wong (“Wong”), a case
about the immigration consequences of a plea deal.58 Wong lived in Canada
for twenty-five years with his wife and Canadian-born child. In 2012, he was
charged with a single count of trafficking cocaine, and he pleaded guilty. Two
immigration consequences followed his conviction: He became inadmissible
for serious criminality, and he lost his right to appeal his inadmissibility to the
Immigration Appeal Division.59 In Wong, the Court split. They agreed that
a plea would be uninformed if the accused was unaware of a legally relevant
collateral consequence and that Wong was, in fact, not aware that his guilty plea
carried immigration consequences. The Supreme Court disagreed, however,
on the test for establishing prejudice. The majority required subjective prejudice,
finding that Wong could not withdraw his guilty plea. The decision to plead
guilty reflected “deeply personal considerations, including subjective levels of
risk tolerance, priorities, family and employment circumstances, and individual
idiosyncrasies.”60 Their judgment turned on Wong’s failure to depose to what he
would have done differently in his affidavit, and the majority’s refusal to draw an
inference based on the factual record.61
The dissent took an objective approach to the reasonable person analysis,
preserving the possibility of a common standard that acknowledges the severity
of deportation. Justice Wagner began by situating the issue squarely on the
terrain of criminal law: Any answer must “strike a balance between core values
of the criminal justice system…while also preserving the finality and order that

56.
57.
58.
59.

Ibid at paras 41-42.
Ibid at para 43.
Wong, supra note 9.
Inadmissibility followed under IRPA, supra note 43, s 36(1). Removal of appeal followed
under IRPA, supra note 43, s 64(1).
60. Wong, supra note 9 at para 11.
61. Ibid at paras 38-39 (the majority refused to draw an inference from the fact that Wong had
taken his case all the way to the Supreme Court, which for many advocates clearly signalled
that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known of the immigration consequences).
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are essential to the integrity of the criminal process.”62 He distinguished Pham,
noting that the accused forfeits their rights in the plea context.63 Most importantly,
Justice Wagner acknowledged that immigration consequences “may well have
mattered more than any criminal sanction in the form of a custodial sentence.”64
The legal consequence of deportation is of a different order of magnitude from
even the most severe criminal consequence because it severs the relationship
between the individual and the state in its entirety.65 Deportation is not analogous
to other personal and subjective factors; it is a universally significant goblin for
non-citizens, especially for permanent residents who have spent little or no part
of their adult lives in their country of citizenship. That reasonable person, Justice
Wagner notes, would not take the certain deportation that accompanies a plea
deal over the risk of deportation implicit in a trial.66 The modified objective
approach to the reasonable person makes permanent resident status a meaningful
factor, affirming the shared “state of deportability” among non-citizens.67 This in
turn clears the path to draw inferences based on this common understanding of
reasonableness.
In these three recent cases, the Supreme Court ducked the implications
of deportation as the consequence of a criminal conviction and maintained
deportation’s non-punitive character. However, underneath obiter statements
that deportation may be analogous to other collateral consequences or subject to
rule of law constraints because it is a peripheral part of the bargain between the
state and its citizens is the implicit recognition that deportation is not sui generis,
that deportation may indeed function as a kind of punishment. And yet it is the
formal holdings that carry over into constitutional law.

62.
63.
64.
65.

Ibid at para 43.
Ibid at para 68.
Ibid at para 103.
Bridget Anderson, Matthew J Gibney & Emanuela Paoletti, “Citizenship, Deportation and
the Boundaries of Belonging” (2011) 15 Citizenship Studies 549; Matthew J Gibney, “Is
Deportation a Form of Forced Migration?” (2013) 32 Refugee Survey Q 119.
66. Wong, supra note 9 at para 106, Wagner J (stating “I do not accept that a reasonable person
would necessarily plead guilty when faced with a strong chance of conviction at trial, even in
light of the fact that a guilty plea would operate as a mitigating factor at sentencing”).
67. Nicholas De Genova & Nathalie Peutz, eds, The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and
the Freedom of Movement (Duke University Press, 2010).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. THE CURTAILMENT OF SECTION 7’S DOCTRINAL SCOPE

When the state exercises coercion and force in its interactions with citizens, it does
so in the context of a sustained and ongoing relationship with the individual. The
Charter modulates the terms of that relationship. The state acts of coercion and
force in the criminal and deportation spheres are often strikingly similar: arrest,
forcible restraint, detention, and transfer. In the criminal frame, these acts are
subject to specific constitutional oversight; in the deportation frame, it is difficult
for non-citizens to access even the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of
the person. In part, this is attributable to individual non-citizen status and the
termination of any ongoing relationship with the state. As a result, however,
coercive and sometimes forceful state acts occurring on state territory remain
largely unscrutinized. Constitutional law in deportation matters is circumscribed
by a series of judicial interpretations, which gather their force from the webbing of
public law. In this section, I first examine the curtailment of section 7’s doctrinal
scope and then turn to the curtailment of access to section 7 protections.68
Section 7 is one of the most important and most-invoked provisions of
the Charter.69 It reads: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice.”70 There are two parts to this provision:
The first concerns the right to life, liberty, and security, while the second
permits deprivations of those rights so long as they are in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice. The rights to liberty and security are the most
often invoked in deportation matters. “The right to liberty implies at least two
elements: freedom from physical restraint and freedom to make fundamental
life choices,” while the right to security includes freedom from both physical

68. Section 12 of the Charter is also important in deportation matters, due to judicial openness
to consideration of deportation as “treatment.” Charter, supra note 29, s 12. I discuss section
12 where applicable.
69. According to a CanLII search, section 7 has been cited in 13,136 cases as of 7 April 2022,
making it the most cited section of the Charter.
70. Charter, supra note 29, s 7.
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harm and state-imposed severe psychological harm.71 The intersections between
deportation and section 7 implicate both of its parts.
Deportation’s remove from section 7 is rooted in the judiciary’s reliance
on both criminal law and administrative law. As set out above, its reliance on
criminal law is based on the field’s prior interpretation of deportation as outside
of its bailiwick. This conception of deportation as non-penal and administrative
in nature precludes robust access to sections 7 to 14 of the Charter. In Reference
re s 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) (“Motor Vehicle Reference”),
Justice Lamer conceived of sections 8 through 14 as “conceptually fused”
to section 7, observing,
Sections 8 to 14 are illustrative of deprivations of those rights to life, liberty and
security of the person in breach of the principles of fundamental justice. For they,
in effect, illustrate some of the parameters of the “right” to life, liberty and security
of the person; they are examples of instances in which the “right” to life, liberty and
security of the person would be violated in a manner which is not in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice.72

As Evan Fox-Decent and Alexander Pless observe, the rights in sections 8 to
14 are often regarded as “elaborations of the fundamental principles of justice
in the detention context,” but they are “parasitical on invasive state action.”73
The criminal law’s eschewal of deportation precludes analogous reasoning that
would permit robust application of section 7, or indeed any application of
sections 8 through 14. However, the reach of constitutional law is equally—
if not more—limited by judicial reliance on the administrative aspects of the
deportation regime.
Judicial reliance on statutory administrative safeguards to interpret section 7
follows two paths. With respect to the first part of section 7—engagement—the
courts have found that deportation itself does not engage section 7. The precise
act that constitutes deportation is in flux, but the rationale for non-engagement
is the doctrine of prematurity. According to this doctrine, if there are remaining
decisions to be made or safeguards to be invoked prior to removal, the invocation
of section 7 is premature. Regarding the second part of section 7—in accordance
71. Both of the harms that violate security include the threat thereof. See Evan Fox-Decent
& Alexander Pless, “The Charter and Administrative Law Part I: Procedural Fairness”
[Fox-Decent & Pless, “Charter”] in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative
Law in Context, 3rd ed (Emond Montgomery, 2018) 237 at 239 [Flood & Sossin 2018];
Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5 at paras 62-64.
72. [1985] 2 SCR 486 at 502 [Motor Vehicle Reference].
73. Fox-Decent & Pless, “Charter,” supra note 71 at 239, n 7; Swain, supra note
37 at 1008-1013.
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with the principles of fundamental justice—courts have consistently found that
the process of deportation as a whole generally accords with those fundamental
principles. Claims of overbreadth and arbitrariness are met by the availability of
procedural fairness and statutory administrative safeguards.
These judicial findings have grown in importance, with the Supreme Court
remarking on the relationship between these administrative processes and the act
of deportation, and then recently refusing leave to appeal them.74 At the same
time, increasing judicial reliance on these interpretative pathways has thickened
the webbing between constitutional law and administrative law. The path to this
point is a winding one. In 1985, during the Charter’s infancy, the Supreme Court
decided Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (“Singh”).
Often considered the pinnacle of Charter protection for non-citizens, the Court
held that section 7 protections apply to “every human being who is physically
present in Canada.”75 Singh’s potential, however, has not been realized.76
Four subsequent Supreme Court cases form the doctrinal backbone of
deportation’s relationship with section 7. In 1992, the Supreme Court squarely
confronted the issue of whether deportation constituted a deprivation of life,
liberty, or security of the person in the Chiarelli case. Chiarelli was a long-term
permanent resident convicted of a series of crimes and the subject of a ministerial
danger opinion.77 The decision’s endurance rests in part on its analytical order
of operations, elided by the subsequent Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) (“Medovarski”) decision. Justice Sopinka did not
decide whether Chiarelli’s deportation engaged section 7 since it was, regardless,
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.78 Ten years later,
74. Febles, supra note 8; B010, supra note 8.
75. Singh, supra note 30 at 202; Dauvergne, “Charter Failure,” supra note 5 at 668.
76. Ibid at 674 (discussing Singh as the “high-water mark”); Grey, supra note 5 (discussing
Supreme Court and Federal Court interpretations of section 7 which curtail Singh’s promise).
77. The Chiarelli case and its progeny are the subjects of sustained scholarly analysis. See
Heckman, supra note 5; Dauvergne, “Charter Failure,” supra note 5; Audrey Macklin, “The
Inside-Out Constitution” in Jacco Bomhoff, David Dyzenhaus & Thomas Poole, eds, The
Double-Facing Constitution (Cambridge University Press, 2020) 243; Asha Kaushal, “The
Constitution in the Shadow of the Immigration State” in Bomhoff, Dyzenhaus & Poole,
supra note 77, 277; Joshua Blum, “The Chiarelli Doctrine: Immigration Exceptionalism
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” 54 UBC L Rev [forthcoming]; Jamie
Liew & Donald Galloway, Immigration Law, 2nd ed (Irwin Law, 2015); Hamish Stewart,
Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Irwin Law,
2007); Ninette Kelley, “Rights in the Balance: Non-Citizens and State Sovereignty Under the
Charter” [Kelley, “Balance”] in Dyzenhaus, supra note 5, 253; R v Appulonappa, 2015 SCC
59 [Appulonappa]; B010, supra note 8. See especially Grey, supra note 5.
78. Chiarelli, supra note 10 at 731-32.
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in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (“Suresh”), the
Supreme Court held that deporting a refugee to torture or risk of harm may
engage section 7.79 Although Suresh prevailed because he had not received
sufficient procedural protections in his deportation proceeding, the decision
nonetheless “diluted the Court’s earlier position in Singh” in part through the
introduction of the device of ‘constitutionalized’ ministerial discretion.80 In 2005,
in Medovarski, the Supreme Court further restricted its partial holding on section
7 from Chiarelli, finding that deportation “in itself cannot implicate the liberty
and security interests protected by s. 7.”81 Finally, in 2007, in the context of
the security certificate regime, the Supreme Court held in Charkaoui v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (“Charkaoui”) that, while deportation
itself could not engage section 7, “some features associated with deportation”
may do so.82 Together, these cases establish that the deportation process generally
accords with fundamental justice; deportation to torture or risk of harm may
engage section 7; deportation itself does not engage section 7; and the procedures
surrounding deportation may engage section 7.
The first judicial tack from section 7 is the doctrine of prematurity, or the
notion that deportation is not yet imminent because “a number of proceedings
may yet take place before…deportation from Canada may occur.”83 Prematurity
precludes the requisite level of causation to engage section 7 life, liberty,
or security interests.84 Grey explains the evolution of the doctrine of prematurity,
following its trajectory from section 12 to section 7, from inadmissibility and
ineligibility in the context of the entire statutory scheme to a decision pertaining
to removal, and from the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) to subsequent
decision points such as deferral of removal and stays of removal.85 Although the
concept of prematurity percolated in the Federal Courts for years, it only reached
the Supreme Court in 2014 in Febles v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)

79. 2002 SCC 1 [Suresh].
80. Kelley, “Balance,” supra note 77 at 279; Dauvergne, “Charter Failure,” supra note 5 at 690.
81. Medovarski v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 51 at para
46 [emphasis added] [Medovarski]. Others have made compelling arguments about the
misreading of Chiarelli and the ill-founded standards of engagement that underwrite
section 7 reasoning. See Heckman, supra note 5; Jamie & Galloway, supra note 77;
Stewart, supra note 77.
82. 2007 SCC 9 at para 17 [Charkaoui].
83. Poshteh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 85 at para 63. This is
well-examined by Heckman, supra note 5.
84. Grey, supra note 5; Heckman, supra note 5.
85. Grey, supra note 5.
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(“Febles”).86 In Febles, Chief Justice McLachlin found Charter compliance in the
availability of a stay of removal under a PRRA application.87
One year later, in B010 v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (“B010”),
Chief Justice McLachlin clarified how the availability of that administrative
remedy answered the section 7 argument: Section 7 was not engaged prior to
that stage.88 The answer to constitutional concerns in both cases, Grey notes,
is “the eventual access to a PRRA.” 89 Heckman then criticized the untenable
situation that these interpretations created for deportees, arguing that courts
have imposed a standard of causation in the immigration and refugee context
more onerous than that which it applies for section 7 generally, including in
criminal and extradition proceedings.90 He demonstrates how deportation’s logic
has not prevailed in other multi-stage proceedings that implicate detention or
imprisonment.91 The practical problem is that the point at which deportation
becomes non-speculative is slowly becoming the moment the deportee is sitting
on the airplane, at which point the issue is effectively moot.
The second judicial tack from section 7 is reliance on the deportation process
“as a whole” to meet the requirements of fundamental justice. The principles of
fundamental justice are both substantive and procedural; they protect against
overbreadth, arbitrariness, and disproportionality, among other things.92 The
procedural justice contemplated by section 7 requires “at minimum, compliance
with the common law requirements of procedural fairness.”93 Due in part to
Justice Sopinka’s reliance on the principles of fundamental justice in Chiarelli
without having ruled on section 7 engagement, these principles have become
the workhorse of constitutional law in deportation matters. Tracking the broad
interpretative trajectory of engagement, the evolution of fundamental justice in
the Federal Courts’ jurisprudence relies on the precept that “the process as a

86. Supra note 8. Other authors have discussed the history of prematurity. See Heckman, supra
note 5 at 347; Grey, supra note 5.
87. Febles, supra note 8; Grey, supra note 5 at 122.
88. B010, supra note 8 at para 75; Grey, supra note 5 at 121.
89. Ibid.
90. Heckman, supra note 5 at 314; Stewart, supra note 77.
91. Heckman, supra note 5 at 351.
92. Motor Vehicle Reference, supra note 72.
93. Suresh, supra note 79 at para 113.
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whole” and “in a total context” preserves fundamental justice.94 The parts of that
process and context may be individualized depending on personal circumstances,
but their totality consistently adds up to an adequate “degree of protection.”95
Federal Court decisions typically list the “individualized legislative safety
valves” available to the deportee to support their holdings that deportation is in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.96 The substance of this
process as a whole overlaps significantly with the set of administrative remedies
and recourse that underwrite the doctrine of prematurity.
Both of the judicial pivots away from section 7 rely on the administrative
parts of deportation. They shift the focus away from the decision at issue and
towards its broader statutory and administrative context. In the following
section, I examine the increasingly absurd results of these interpretations through
three recent Federal Court of Appeal cases for which the Supreme Court refused
leave to appeal.
B. THE CURTAILMENT OF ACCESS TO SECTION 7 PROTECTIONS: FROM
SINGH TO MORETTO

The role of section 7 in deportation matters is limited by the doctrine of
prematurity and the role of administrative safeguards. Prematurity means that
deportation proceedings will not engage section 7 until the very final stage of
proceedings, if at all, and the existence of administrative safeguards means that
such proceedings will accord with the principles of fundamental justice. The
shaky foundation that these interpretations laid for section 7 took a turn for the
worse when the Supreme Court refused leave in a trio of cases in March 2020.
The Supreme Court’s leave refusals cemented the curious ambulation of section
7 in deportation cases, which is now engaged at the beginning of a refugee claim,
then disengages for the duration of removal proceedings, only to reengage for the
final individualized stage of proceedings. In what follows, I explain the series of
cases that created this on/off switch for section 7.
Both parts of the section 7 analysis in deportation matters rely on the
perspective that deportation is not a singular act, but rather a series of stages
94. Revell, supra note 7 at para 211. See also Powell v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2004 FC 1120 at para 30 [Powell]; Stables v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2011 FC 1319 at para 56 [Stables]; Torre v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2015 FC 591, aff’d 2016 FCA 48, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36936 (25
August 2016) [Torre]; Brar v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),
2016 FC 1214 [Brar].
95. Powell, supra note 94 at para 28.
96. See e.g. Moretto, supra note 7 at paras 59-66; Stables, supra note 94.
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and decisions that together constitute the deportation proceeding. This requires
a brief explanation of how deportation works. After an individual has entered
Canada, they may be found inadmissible. In the usual course, inadmissibility
renders them vulnerable to deportation. There are several statutory grounds of
inadmissibility, including criminality, misrepresentation, and health and financial
grounds.97 An inadmissibility finding generally triggers a section 44 report, which
may result in a removal order.98 There is a gap between the removal order coming
into force under IRPA, section 49, and a removal order becoming enforceable
under IRPA, section 48.99 These sections are reproduced below:
48(1)	
A removal order is enforceable if it has come into force
and is not stayed.
(2)	If a removal order is enforceable, the foreign national against
whom it was made must leave Canada immediately and the
order must be enforced as soon as possible.100
49(1)	
A removal order comes into force on the latest of the
following dates:
(a)	The day the removal order is made, if there is no right to appeal;
(b)	The day the appeal period expires, if there is a right to appeal
and no appeal is made; and
(c)	
The day of the final determination of the appeal,
if an appeal is made.
Individuals subject to a removal order in force have essentially three options:
they may leave voluntarily, they may challenge their removal order, or they
may do nothing and risk forcible removal.101 Removal is complicated by the
availability of recourse options in the gap between the section 44 report and the
enforcement of a removal order. A select group of individuals may appeal their
removal orders to the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD).102 Individuals may
also apply for a stay of their removal order, whether as part of their IAD appeal or
97. IRPA, supra note 43, ss 34-42.
98. Ibid, ss 44(1)-(2).
99. There is also a gap between the s 44 report (which may not correspond to the removal order
in force) and enforceability.
100. IRPA, supra note 43, ss 48-49.
101. IRPR, supra note 44, s 239. Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) data obtained through
Access to Information and Privacy Act (“ATIP”) requests showed that actual removals most
frequently involve departure orders converted into deportation orders because the individual
did not depart (ATIP responses, on file with author).
102. This is available only to a small category of people, mostly permanent residents, and not
those with a serious inadmissibility. See IRPA, supra note 43, ss 63-65.
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by statutory, regulatory, or judicial stay application.103 Then, there are three types
of statutory administrative processes that, if granted, will allow the individual to
remain. For most people, each of these processes carries the option of permanent
residence down the line. The first is the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA).
It measures risk in the country of return.104 The person will not be removed
until the PRRA application has been decided. Second, there is the Humanitarian
and Compassionate (H&C) application.105 Pending H&C applications do not
stop removal. The third possibility is a temporary resident permit (TRP).106
Successful TRP applicants receive a temporary exemption from a requirement of
the statute for compelling short-term reasons. Embedded in IRPA, section 48(2)
is also the possibility of deferred removal, which may be requested and granted in
exceptional cases but cannot be directly translated into permanent status.
The administrative remedies that operate in this gap have come to play a
pivotal role in section 7 deportation analysis. This heightened role stems from
the judicial focus on what precisely constitutes the deportation act. That inquiry
has now moved to the centre of judicial deportation analysis. Because several
of these administrative safeguards operate in the beat between the issuance of
a removal order and its enforceability, they hold the key to the deportation act.
In Febles and B010, the Supreme Court indicated that for individuals who are
at risk, the PRRA crystallized the deportation act, engaging section 7. However,
this is not the bright line that it had appeared to be. A number of deportees
do not have access to the PRRA. Refugee claimants, of whom Singh was one,
follow a separate process through the statutory scheme, which includes different
procedural requirements as well as different available risk assessments.107 Some
failed refugee claimants may not have access to a PRRA because of the PRRA bar.
103. There are judicial stays, statutory stays, and regulatory stays. See IRPA, supra note 43,
s 50. For a judicial stay, the applicant must have an underlying application for leave for
judicial review.
104. ENF 10, supra note 46, s 25.3. If a removals officer decides the individual is not eligible, then
the recourse is to judicially review that decision. This is determined by officers in accordance
with IRPA, supra note 43, s 112(2). See also generally ENF 10, supra note 46, s 25.
105. IRPA, supra note 43, s 25. See also Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Guide
5291 - Humanitarian and Compassionate Considerations” (last modified 6 June 2021),
online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/
services/application/application-forms-guides/guide-5291-humanitarian-compassionateconsiderations.html> [Guide 5291].
106. See IRPA, supra note 43, ss 25 (H&C), 112 (PRRA), 24 (TRP).
107. A refugee claimant receives a conditional removal order that comes into force if their
claim is found ineligible, rejected, withdrawn, abandoned, or terminated. See IRPA, supra
note 43, s 49(2).
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Additionally, very few deportees who are not also failed refugee claimants will
face the type of risk contemplated by the PRRA upon return.108
In Kreishan v. Canada (“Kreishan”), one of the cases that sought leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court, the Federal Court of Appeal addressed the
constitutionality of the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) bar for failed refugee
claimants.109 Justice Rennie explained that the refugee determination process was
bookended by two constitutional protections: initial adjudication and removal
consistent with international law.110 Upon the first presentation of a refugee
claim, section 7 requires the right to a hearing before an independent decision
maker. Section 7 then re-engages at the conclusion of the process to ensure that
claimants are not removed to face section 7 risks.111 In terms of the deportation
(rather than refugee) proceedings, section 7 interests are protected at the removal
stage, “whether by a PRRA, a request to defer removal or the right to seek a stay
of removal in the Federal Court.”112 The claimants in Kreishan, although barred
from RAD, could still “seek a deferral of removal administratively, failing which,
[they could] seek a stay in the Federal Court.”113 What remained, then, were
these two temporary and exceptional measures through which the claimants’
section 7 interests were protected. Although the refugee process is distinct from
the immigration process, the processes intersect at the removal stage at which
point an immigrant is equally entitled to a PRRA (if they are at risk), a request
for deferral, or a stay. After Kreishan, it stands that section 7 interests are engaged
upon making a refugee claim through the hearing requirement, then disengaged
for the remaining determinations, only to reengage again at the very end of the
deportation process.
At the beginning of 2020, counsel for Kreishan sought leave to appeal to
the Supreme Court. One month later, counsel in Revell v. Canada (“Revell”) and
Moretto v. Canada (“Moretto”) sought leave as well.114 These three cases, although
substantively different, each addressed the puzzling operation of section 7 in
108. IRPA, supra note 43, ss 112(2)(b.1)-(c) (the PRRA “bar”).
109. Kreishan, supra note 7. Refugee claims are heard by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD)
and may generally be appealed to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD). However, certain
exceptional categories of refugee claimants under the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA)
do not have a right to appeal to the RAD. The right of appeal for STCA-excepted claimants
was the crux of the issue in Kreishan.
110. Kreishan, supra note 7 at paras 113, 117.
111. Ibid at para 117.
112. Ibid at para 122.
113. Ibid at para 127.
114. Moretto, supra note 7; Revell, supra note 7.
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removal proceedings. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal in all three cases,
leaving the Federal Court of Appeal decisions as the last word on the matter. The
result is that immigration counsel will have to continue to argue into the thicket
of public law webbing about the details of the administrative remedies and how
and where they may fall short of section 7 requirements.
Revell and Moretto were long-term permanent residents. They immigrated
from the United Kingdom and Italy, respectively, when they were children. They
did not make refugee claims and they did not face risk upon return. In separate
applications, they challenged their deportations under sections 7 and 12 of the
Charter and asked the Federal Courts to reconsider Chiarelli and Medovarski.115
The cases were heard together, and the same panel of the Federal Court of Appeal
delivered the decisions on the same day. They illuminate section 7 in non-refugee
claimant removal proceedings, focusing attention on what constitutes the
deportation act and sharpening how it is modulated by its administrative
character, requirements, and remedies.
David Revell immigrated to Canada at the age of 10. He has three adult
children in Canada. In 2008, he was convicted of drug possession and trafficking,
and then later pleaded guilty to separate charges of assault, which ultimately
landed him before the Immigration Division (ID) for an inadmissibility hearing.
The ID found that Revell’s section 7 rights were engaged but that the deprivation
was in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.116 Upon review,
the Federal Court found that the ID erred in finding that section 7 was engaged
but otherwise agreed with the ID on fundamental justice. The decision at issue
for the Federal Court of Appeal, then, was Revell’s “inadmissibility adjudication
stage,” for which it had to address both parts of section 7.117 With respect to
section 7 engagement, Justice De Montigny distinguished between causation
and foreseeability. Addressing Heckman’s argument that section 7 engagement
in immigration and refugee matters runs counter to the low causation standard
set out in Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General) (“Bedford”),118 the Federal Court
of Appeal stated:
What is uncertain here is not whether the state will eventually be responsible for
the deportation if it actually occurs, but whether the likelihood of it is real enough

115. Moretto also challenged his deportation under section 2(d) of the Charter. See
Moretto, supra note 7.
116. Revell, supra note 7 at paras 14-27.
117. Ibid at para 35.
118. 2013 SCC 72.
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to take it outside the realm of pure speculation and engage the rights protected by
section 7 of the Charter.119

Justice De Montigny observed that Bedford “speaks to the cause of the
prejudice.”120 It was ad idem between the parties and the court that when Revell
was deported, the state would have caused his deportation; the issue was the
likelihood of Revell’s deportation. Is the decision proximate enough for his eventual
deportation to have passed the speculative stage? In explaining this foreseeability
requirement, the Federal Court of Appeal noted that “an admissibility hearing is
but one step in a complex, multi-tiered inadmissibility determination and removal
regime under the IRPA.”121 The Federal Court of Appeal refused Revell’s argument
that his inadmissibility determination was proximate enough to removal, listing
the remaining possibilities: ministerial relief under IRPA, section 42.1(1) (which
would remove the inadmissibility) in combination with an H&C application;
a PRRA; and an IRPA, section 48 deferral of removal. These three possibilities
kept Revell’s inadmissibility from being proximate enough to deportation, and
thus kept section 7 of the Charter from engagement.
With respect to fundamental justice, the Federal Court of Appeal accepted
that the approach to the principles of fundamental justice had “significantly
evolved” since the birth of the Charter and the Chiarelli and Medovarski
decisions, but disagreed that Revell had met the high threshold required to
depart from precedent.122 Justice De Montigny upheld the fundamental justice
of the deportation process based on the presence of “a number of safety valves
in the IRPA ensuring that the deportation process as a whole is in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice.”123 “At each and every step of this
process, an applicant is entitled to make submissions and to be represented by
counsel, may challenge any decision by way of an application for judicial review
before the Federal Court, and may seek a stay of removal”;124 these features of
administrative procedural law (judicial review, stays, submissions, counsel) ensure
that the deportation process accords with fundamental justice. Considering
overbreadth in particular, the Federal Court of Appeal observed that the safety
valves provided by the Act “save the paragraphs in question from any charge of

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Revell, supra note 7 at para 45.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 97.
Ibid at paras 46-52.
Ibid at para 51.
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overbreadth by effectively narrowing their scope,” and that “this whole process
acts as a safety valve.”125
In making these findings, Justice De Montigny remarked that the nature of
the section 7 rights at issue is determinative. “The process leading to the potential
infringement of these rights must be fair and in accordance with the basic tenets
of our judicial system”126—this is fundamental justice. There is no doubt,
he observed, “that the procedural aspects of section 7 are engaged as soon as a
person’s right to life, liberty or security are put at risk by state action.”127 Linking
section 7 of the Charter, procedural justice, and the principles of fundamental
justice together, he found that “it is in this sense that section 7 can be said to
permeate the entire extradition and criminal process, and the same can probably
be said of the inadmissibility and removal process under the IRPA.”128 On the
other hand, the substantive aspects of section 7 rights need not be considered at
every step of the process. “The jurisprudence in the immigration context is clear:
section 7 rights are considered at the removal or pre-removal detention stage.”129
These substantive aspects are the interests engaged by section 7. In order to get
under this substantive tent, the consequences or harms of deportation “would go
beyond the typical impacts of removal,” which Revell’s did not.130
The tenability of this distinction between procedural and substantive aspects
of section 7 is uncertain. On the one hand, section 7 clearly consists of two
parts, and the fundamental principles of justice necessarily include common law
procedural fairness.131 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has confirmed that
the fundamental principles of justice are not only procedural, which means one
cannot simply map substance onto interests and procedure onto fundamental
justice.132 Indeed, prior Federal Court case law included many more safety valves,
some of them substantive assessments of risk or hardship, as part of the “total
context” of the fundamental principles of justice. This suggests that Justice De
Montigny’s distinction is a pivot from precedent. In Powell, the “total context that
has preserved consistency with the principles of fundamental justice” included
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Ibid at paras 115-16 (referring to IRPA, supra note 43, ss 36(1)(a) and 37(1)(a)).
Revell, supra note 7 at para 55.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 56.
Ibid at para 66 (Revell argued his section 7 interests were engaged because of the sufficiently
serious consequences of deportation and because the psychological harm of deportation was
“a feature associated with deportation” per Charkaoui, supra note 82).
131. Suresh, supra note 79.
132. Motor Vehicle Reference, supra note 72.
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judicial review, the PRRA, and the H&C.133 Fundamental justice was found
in the “degree of protection” provided by the listed administrative remedies.
Subsequent cases then picked up this thread and articulated the individualized
components of this total context.134
The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed Moretto’s appeal for “essentially…the
same reasons” given in Revell.135 Massimo Moretto was a long-term permanent
resident who immigrated to Canada from Italy when he was nine months old.
He challenged the decision to lift the stay of removal against him that held his
inadmissibility in abeyance. One of the distinctions between Moretto and Revell is
their stage of deportation proceedings. In Moretto, the issue was the Immigration
Appeal Division (IAD) decision to automatically cancel his stay of removal
pursuant to section 68(4) of IRPA because of his subsequent conviction.136
Although the Federal Court below agreed that recent developments in the case
law permitted reconsideration of the binding nature of Chiarelli, the Federal
Court of Appeal rolled back this decision.137
Moretto argued that section 68(4) was the decision that rendered his
deportation order enforceable. There were no remaining steps between the
operation of section 68(4) of IRPA and his removal: “[H]is PRRA was denied,
his humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) application is not a bar to removal,
and the discretion left to enforcement officers at the removal stage is highly
limited.”138 With respect to prematurity, however, Justice De Montigny observed
that the appellant could still apply for a TRP, seek a deferral of removal at a later
stage of his deportation process, and apply for an H&C.139 As for fundamental
justice, Moretto argued that the presence of “safety valves” was irrelevant because
section 68(4) “removes any further opportunity to explain his circumstances to a
decision maker.”140 The Federal Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that Moretto’s
circumstances were considered at the report and referral stage, as well as the
“quasi-judicial hearing” before the ID, and under the IAD’s H&C jurisdiction,
133. Powell, supra note 94 at para 30.
134. See e.g. Stables, supra note 94 at para 56, de Montigny J (s 44 report submissions, ID hearing,
PRRA, and judicial review); Torre, supra note 94 at paras 74-75 (PRRA, IRPA s 42.1
exemption, and judicial review); Brar, supra note 94 at paras 27-28 (s 44 submissions and
Minister’s Delegate weighing H&C factors).
135. Moretto, supra note 7 at para 3.
136. The IAD decision to lift the stay also cancelled his access to appeal.
137. Moretto, supra note 7.
138. Ibid at para 42.
139. Ibid at para 44.
140. Ibid at para 59.
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and then in the Federal Court review of his IAD decision, and upon IAD
redetermination.141 Justice De Montigny used these processes to protect against
overbreadth and gross disproportionality. Later, the Federal Court of Appeal
relied on the remaining “safety valves” to affirm that there was no violation of the
principles of fundamental justice, observing that “even at this late stage,” Moretto
could make an application for a TRP, H&C, PRRA, and deferral of removal.142
This is hard to reconcile with the analytical framework for engagement, which
insists that the deportation act does not crystallize until the very last stage of
the deportation proceeding. Several of the prior proceedings to which Justice
Montigny referred (section 44 report, ID, and IAD hearings) contemplated acts
that a prematurity analysis had deemed not yet to have occurred and were therefore
immune from section 7 scrutiny. As Moretto edged closer to the deportation act,
the fundamental justice of those more proximate stages should have provided an
equivalent opportunity to explain his circumstances as the prior stages.
Each applicant filed a psychologist report. Moretto’s described deportation
as “a life-shortening event,” while Revell’s observed that, without his family,
Revell would be “devoid of direction and purpose.”143 Moretto’s history of
mental health and addiction problems juxtaposes the absence of intersectional
frameworks of harm in the deportation context with the growing emphasis on
social determinants of justice in other public law fields. The question in Moretto
and Revell was whether such psychological or social harm exceeded the threshold
of ordinariness, rather than how these social determinants had figured into their
life histories, their interactions with the justice system, and their treatment in
the immigration regime. This is attributable both to the axis of non-citizenship
around which deportation rotates and to the webbing of deportation doctrine,
which trains the judicial eye on the form of administrative remedies rather than
the substance of access to justice.
The cases opened two potential lines of constitutional recourse, although
neither was successful. The first concerned psychological harm under section
7, which was made out by the evidentiary record and exceeded the ordinary
consequences of removal, but the Federal Court of Appeal was nonetheless
reluctant to overturn Medovarski.144 The second concerned section 12. Revell
141. Ibid at para 61 (s 44 referral process, H&C application, PRRA, and deferral removal prevent
overbreadth), 62-64 (s 44 referral process, ID and IAD hearings, and judicial review provide
individual assessment), 65 (H&C application, TRP, PRRA, and deferred removal prevent
gross disproportionality and overbreadth).
142. Ibid at para 65.
143. Moretto, supra note 7 at para 36; Revell, supra note 7 at para 31.
144. Revell, supra note 7 at paras 30-34; Moretto, supra note 7 at para 36.

Kaushal, The

Webbing of Public Law 323

foreclosed treating deportation as punishment, citing Tran and Chiarelli, and
reinforcing the strands of the web: “Inadmissibility proceedings are therefore
not criminal or quasi-criminal in nature, and courts have consistently held that
the deportation of a person found criminally inadmissible to Canada is not
imposed as punishment.”145 The Federal Court of Appeal agreed that “treatment”
could “probably” include deportation but did not decide this point because the
treatment was not cruel and unusual.146
In many ways, these cases raise more questions than answers. Precisely which
stage of decision making constitutes the deportation act remains an outstanding
and individualized issue. In Kreishan, it was either a deferral of removal or a judicial
stay. In Revell, it was section 42.1 in combination with an H&C application,
a PRRA, or deferral of removal. And in Moretto, it was an H&C application,
a TRP, or a deferral of removal. The common remaining stage suggests that the
deportation act, for those who are not at risk, will likely come to rest on deferral
of removal. Apart from the load these interpretations place on deferral, which I
explore in the next section, they also lead to the concern that there is little time
between the decision refusing deferral and the actual deportation. If this is the
point when section 7 turns on, then it does not amount to meaningful protection
of section 7 interests.
This formalistic understanding of deportation as the final potential act of
removal is premised on the webbing of public law. The Federal Court of Appeal
repeatedly points to remaining administrative possibilities to justify the limited
reach of constitutional law. This marks a pan-public law approach that looks
across the public law fields. The webbing is visible in both parts of the section 7
inquiry, but each seems to rely on a different conception of the administrative
processes, either as separate, individual modes of recourse or as part of a single
multi-stage proceeding. On section 7 engagement, the judiciary views deportation
as a singular act in a long, inter-connected scheme. Each of the decision-making
points is individuated, which means the deportation act remains speculative until
the final decision-making point. On fundamental justice, the judiciary views
deportation as a regime consisting of several stages and processes, such that the
“process as a whole” or the “total context” protects deportation from violating
fundamental justice. In the result, reliance on criminal and administrative law
keeps deportation from constitutional law’s embrace. This demands scrutiny of
the equivalency between these fields. The administrative processes and safeguards
aim to protect procedural fairness, to guard against errors (particularly those
145. Revell, supra note 7 at para 54. See also Tran, supra note 9 at para 43; Chiarelli, supra note 10.
146. Revell, supra note 7 at para 125.
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involving risk), and to soften the harsh consequences of immigration law in
compelling cases. They do not address the substantive concerns that underwrite
the constitutionality of deportation.147

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. THE MEANING OF ADMINISTRATIVE FAIRNESS

The relationships between the three fields of public law are most developed—
and their webbing is thickest—when it comes to administrative law. While
criminal law relies primarily on higher order categorizations of deportation’s
“administrative nature,” constitutional law particularizes this reliance, referring
to specific administrative solutions. This section examines administrative law in
the deportation context, which comprehends the powers to legislate, to exercise
discretion, and to adjudicate.148 Focusing on administrative fairness in the
intersecting contexts of delegation and discretion exposes how and why reliance
on administrative law to protect the deportee is misplaced. The regulatory nature
and scope of administrative law instruments are distinct and self-limiting.
The administrative law of deportation has several unique features. Its internal
statutory requirements and the limits they place on access to justice are the most
significant. Nearly all immigration-related cases must go through the Federal
Courts.149 The primary exception to this requirement is habeas corpus claims
about immigration detention, which, since 2019, may go through provincial
courts.150 All applicants must obtain leave to judicially review their decision;
in order to appeal the review decision, the sitting judge must certify a “serious
question of general importance”; the appellant must have funding to appeal;
and then, with a Federal Court of Appeal decision in hand, the appellant must

147. This was argued by Revell and dismissed by the Federal Court. See ibid at para 112.
148. See Sharryn J Aiken et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary,
3rd ed (Emond, 2020) at 130.
149. Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, s 17(1). See Craig Forcese, “Making a Federal Case Out
of It: The Federal Court and Administrative Law” in Flood & Sossin 2018, supra note 71,
553 at 557 (confirming that administrative cases based on issues of constitutionality may be
brought in either section 96 provincial superior courts or federal courts).
150. Chhina, supra note 47 at para 17.
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receive leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.151 Not infrequently,
the Federal Court diverges in its approach to particular immigration issues.152
Due to the peculiar nature of judicial review in the immigration context, these
divergent lines of authority will only be reconciled if such a question is certified
at the Federal Court level and one of the parties to the case decides to appeal it.
Together, these requirements limit access to public law processes in deportation
matters well before courts even reach questions of application in administrative,
constitutional, or criminal law. These kinds of judicial requirements do not exist
in other administrative regimes of Canadian law.
In the contexts of delegation and discretion, administrative law generally
enters the frame through the common law, through statutory requirements,
or through the Charter’s fundamental principles of justice.153 These sources
relate and overlap in ways that make it most productive to follow their evolution
through two frameworks. The first framework is administrative common law,
primarily the common law procedural rules of natural justice, including fairness,
notice, disclosure of the case to be met, and the right to make submissions.
The fundamental principles of justice in section 7 incorporate common law
procedural fairness at minimum, requiring natural justice, and may surpass
the requirements of the common law.154 I refer to these forms of natural justice
and procedural fairness jointly as “administrative fairness,” regardless of their
151. Only 18.6% of immigration proceedings commenced at the Federal Court between 2010
and 2019 obtained leave for judicial review (14,586 of 78,250). See “Statistics” (last
visited 18 June 2020), online: Federal Court <www.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/pages/about-the-court/
reports-and-statistics/statistics>. The FC has certified 157 questions in that time span
or on average 16 per year. See “Certified Questions (Immigration/Citizenship)” (last
visited 18 June 2020), online: Federal Court <www.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/pages/law-and-practice/
certified-questions-immigrationcitizenship>.
152. This has happened with respect to calculating residency for citizenship, the test for a genuine
marriage, and the standard of review for certified questions. See also David Stratas, “The
Canadian Law of Judicial Review: A Plea for Doctrinal Coherence and Consistency” (2016)
42 Queen’s LJ 27.
153. Audrey Macklin, “Citizenship, Non-Citizenship and the Rule of Law” (2018) 69 UNBLJ
19 at 25 (observing that discretion is “always bounded and informed by law” and including
international law).
154. Singh, supra note 30 at 212 (“the concept of ‘fundamental justice’ as it appears in s 7 of
the Charter includes the notion of procedural fairness”); Suresh, supra note 79 at para 113
(incorporating Baker on common law procedural fairness). In the refugee context, procedural
fairness has required the right to an oral hearing (Singh) and higher requirements prior to
removal to counter the risk inherent in deporting refugee claimants. See Singh, supra note
30 at 213-16; Suresh, supra note 79 at paras 115-23. This section does not address either
the issue of Charter values, which have not achieved traction in deportation, or tribunals’
authorities to decide constitutional questions. On the latter, see Revell, supra note 7.
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common law or Charter origin.155 Administrative fairness has been the most
fruitful line of judicial recourse for non-citizens. The second framework takes
shape in the various forms of statutory recourse and remedies. The judiciary refers
to these statutory, administrative processes as “safeguards” or “safety valves.”156
The internal limits of these administrative remedies, and their discretionary,
quasi-judicial, or judicial nature are examined in the next section. In what
follows, I explore the jurisprudential contours of the public law webbing with
respect to administrative fairness.
Immigration law is distinguished from other branches of administrative law
by the number, variety, and expertise of administrative decision makers operating
under its umbrella. From visa officers abroad to removal officers inland, from
officers and tribunal members without formal legal education to appellate judges
with decades of legal expertise, the labyrinth of immigration decision making
is diverse.157 The complexities stem from the variety of decisions and decision
makers and the relationships between them. Those who administer procedural
fairness may do so at various decision points throughout the deportation process.
The same may be said of the invocation and adjudication of administrative
safeguards. The content of administrative fairness varies according to the type
of decision at issue and therefore often implicitly differs according to the status
of the individual. Depending on the particular constellation of factors at issue,
decision makers will be differently positioned, trained, and empowered. The
categorical unity of this broad and deep administrative framework has elided
significant distinctions between decision makers and their decisions at the same
time that it has distinguished homologous acts and settings in order to attenuate
levels and kinds of legal protections.158
The deportation framework is administered by the Minister of Immigration,
Refugees and Citizenship, with some functions delegated to the Minister
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, their delegated departmental
155. I use the term “administrative fairness,” following Heckman, supra note 5.
156. Seklani v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 778 at paras 29-30; Begum v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 409 at paras 107, 113 (on safeguards), 111
(on safety valves). See also Revell, supra note 7 at paras 52, 115-17; Moretto, supra note 7 at
paras 59, 65; Stables, supra note 94 at para 56 (on safety valves).
157. Immigration decisions typically involve two government departments (Immigration,
Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) and Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA))
and sometimes three (Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC)); immigration
decision makers include officers (both overseas and in Canada), tribunals, and courts.
158. See Canada, Department of Manpower and Immigration, Canadian Immigration Policy,
1966: White Paper on Immigration (Queen’s Printer, 1966) at para 84 (“the procedures
leading to an order of deportation…are inseparable from any law enforcement activity”).
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decision makers, and independent agencies. Many of the powers delegated to the
Ministers are discretionary, and discretionary decisions (together with judicial
review of those decisions) form the bulk of deportation decision making. The
authority for Ministerial designation and delegation is contained in sections 6(1)
and (2) of IRPA.
6 (1)	The Minister may designate any persons or class of persons as
officers to carry out any purpose of any provision of this Act, and
shall specify the powers and duties of the officers so designated.
(2)	Anything that may be done by the Minister under this Act may
be done by a person that the Minister authorizes in writing,
without proof of the authenticity of the authorization.159
As a result, Richard Haigh and Jim Smith observe, the immigration statute is “a
compendium of discretionary powers distributed among various governmental
actors.”160 The Ministers turn quickly into Ministerial delegates, immigration and
visa officers, and border services officers; each category has subcategories.161 These
expansive delegations are an essential part of immigration decision making, and
their elaboration foreshadows the complexities of adjudicating discretion.162
It is helpful here to return to the Supreme Court’s deportation canon to
observe its administrative law underpinnings. Included this time is Baker v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (“Baker”),163 which provided
the architecture for the early webbing. The Supreme Court’s preference for
administrative and statutory interpretation frameworks over constitutional ones
was first visible in Singh. Although Singh had opened the proverbial gates of
section 7 to “everyone,” Justice Wilson found that if the procedural fairness issues
159. IRPA, supra note 43, s 6(1)-(3). Section 6(3) refers to particular decisions that the Minister
may not delegate (i.e., powers conferred under ss 20.1, 22.1, 42.1, 77(1)).
160. “Return of the Chancellor’s Foot? Discretion in Permanent Resident Deportation Appeals
under the Immigration Act” (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall LJ 245 at 256.
161. See Department of Citizenship and Immigration, “Instrument of Designation & Delegation”
(6 January 2021), online (pdf ): <www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/
resources/manuals/il/il3-eng.pdf>. For CBSA directions, see Canadian Border Services
Agency, “Delegation of Authority and Designations of Officers by the Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations” (last modified 24 January 2018),
online: Government of Canada <www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/actreg-loireg/delegation/
irpa-lipr-2016-07-eng.html>.
162. On the complexities of discretion, see Colleen M Flood & Jennifer Dolling, “A Historical
Map for Administrative Law; There Be Dragons” [Flood & Dolling, “Historical”] in Flood &
Sossin 2018, supra note 71, 1 at 37-38.
163. [1999] 2 SCR 817 [Baker].
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raised by Singh were not excluded by the statute, then “there was no basis for
resort to the Charter.”164 This preference for non-constitutional bases of decision
making would prove portentous.
In 1999, Mavis Baker successfully challenged an immigration officer’s
refusal of her H&C application. Baker brought a motion to set a number of
constitutional questions, which the Supreme Court denied. Accordingly, “[the
case] was framed primarily in terms of the role of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and the CRC [Convention on the Rights of the Child] in interpreting
the limits of administrative discretion.”165 In Baker, the Supreme Court squarely
addressed legal accountability for “ministerial exercises of discretion.”166 Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé found that the officer’s failure to consider the best interests of
the children constituted an “unreasonable exercise of discretion,” reinforcing the
constitutional commitment that “all persons…must adhere to the rule of law
and respect fundamental constitutional values.”167 From the perspective of the
webbing, however, the decision circumscribed the role for those fundamental
values by emphasizing the administrative nature of the decision. For the majority,
Justice L’HeureuxDubé wrote, “the issues raised can be resolved under the
principles of administrative law and statutory interpretation, I find it unnecessary
to consider the various Charter issues raised.”168 The Supreme Court would follow
this order of operations three years later in Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), solidifying the outsized importance of administrative law in
deportation matters.169
Coming on the heels of Baker, the Suresh decision further developed the role
of discretionary decision making in the webbing of the public law framework.
164. This is the difference between procedural fairness under the common law versus procedural
fairness under section 7: Statutory language cannot alter procedural fairness rights under the
Charter. See Fox-Decent & Pless, supra note 71; Singh, supra note 30 at 188.
165. Sharryn Aiken & Sheena Scott, “Baker v. Canada and the Rights of Children” (2000) 15 J L
& Soc Pol’y 211 at 219.
166. Flood & Dolling, “Historical,” supra note 162 at 38.
167. Mary Liston, “Administering the Canadian Rule of Law” in Flood & Sossin 2018, supra note
71, 139 at 174 (discussing Doré’s contribution to this understanding).
168. Baker, supra note 163 at para 11.
169. 2002 SCC 3 at para 19 (“In my view, this appeal can be decided by applying principles of
administrative law and statutory interpretation, as was the case in this Court’s decision in
Baker v. Canada”) [Chieu]. Chieu was released on the same day as Suresh. See also Audrey
Macklin, “The State of Law’s Borders and the Law of States’ Borders” in Dyzenhaus, supra
note 5, 173 at 188-90 (observing that the common law principles of administrative law
served Baker better than section 7 of the Charter and contrasting “the situated subject of
administrative law and the deracinated constitutional subject”).
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The Supreme Court found that removing Suresh, a refugee, to Sri Lanka
where he faced a substantial risk of torture violated his section 7 rights.170 This
finding, while based on section 7 engagement, is not as expansively protective
or constitutional as it first appears. On the one hand, the Court located the
constitutional problem in the exercise of Ministerial discretion rather than in
the statutory provision granting the discretion.171 On the other, the Court found
that this exercise of Ministerial discretion violated Suresh’s procedural rights to
fundamental justice, which the Court proceeded to analyze using the common
law test developed in Baker.172 In the result, this “constitutionalized” Ministerial
discretion entitled Suresh to a copy of the reports and memoranda underwriting
his deportation, an opportunity to respond to them, and written reasons for the
Minister’s decision—an administrative answer to a human rights question.173
In 2007, the Charkaoui decision maintained this emphasis on administrative
frameworks.174 Charkaoui was detained as a threat to national security with no
deportation date in sight and limited access to the evidence against him.175 The
Supreme Court expanded the scope of Chiarelli and Medovarski, finding that
while it was bound to agree that deportation itself could not infringe constitutional
liberty and security interests, features of the deportation process could do so.
The procedures for determining the reasonableness of a security certificate and
for detention review, both statutorily required to be performed by judges rather
than exercises of Ministerial discretion, were found unconstitutional.176 These
infringements could be met by the requirements of a fair hearing and timely
detention reviews, respectively.177 Charkaoui was not concerned with delegated

170. Suresh, supra note 79 at para 130.
171. Peter J Carver, “Shelter From the Storm: A Comment on Suresh v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration)” (2002) 40 Alta L Rev 465; Audrey Macklin, “Mr. Suresh and
the Evil Twin” (2002) 20 Refuge 15 (arguing that the terms of the decision leave the state
“wide scope to circumvent the spirit of the judgment”).
172. Carver, supra note 171 at 479.
173. See Dauvergne, “Charter Failure,” supra note 5 at 690; Suresh, supra note 79 at para 121-30.
174. Charkaoui, supra note 82.
175. Medovarksi, supra note 81 at para 46 [emphasis added]. Others have made compelling
arguments about the misreading of Chiarelli and the ill-founded standards of engagement
that underwrite section 7 reasoning. See Heckman, supra note 5; Liew & Galloway, supra
note 77; Stewart, supra note 77.
176. Charkaoui, supra note 82.
177. Ibid.
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discretionary decision making but it nonetheless relied on administrative
frameworks to resolve constitutional problems.178
In recent cases, the courts have returned to the knotty relationship between
statutory provisions and discretionary decisions. In 2015, in R. v. Appulonappa
(“Appulonappa”), the Supreme Court found that IRPA, section 117, which
criminalized the smuggling of non-citizens into Canada, was unconstitutionally
overbroad and contrary to section 7 insofar as it also captured humanitarian
efforts, mutual aid, and family members.179 The residual prosecutory discretion
of the Attorney General could not save the statutory provision because it did
not preclude their consent in overbroad circumstances.180 Immigration advocates
argue that Appulonappa requires the statutory constraint of discretion in order
to maintain the constitutionality of its exercise, but that line of argument has
not achieved much traction. In the recent case of Brown v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), the Federal Court of Appeal was faced with the
constitutionality of immigration detention without time limits.181 Although
Justice Rennie acknowledged shortcomings with the detention scheme,
he characterized them as issues with the maladministration of detention.
Distinguishing Appulonappa on the basis of the unconstitutionality of its
underlying provision, he found that the “[t]he Charter does not require that the
possibility of maladministration pursuant to a statutory grant of discretion be
eradicated from statutes.”182 Brown is the most recent foothold in the ladder of
judicial decisions that emphasize discretion, properly exercised, as a response to
larger, often systemic, deficiencies.
The form that administrative law frameworks take in deportation cases will
depend upon the specific constellation of factors: the nature of the decision, the
terms of the statute, the identity of the decision maker, and the bounds of their
discretion. The mechanisms through which the administrative frameworks of
discretion and fairness figure decisively in the constitutionality of the statutory
scheme is a key part of the connective tissue of public law. Problems that appear
178. Kent Roach, “Charkaoui and Bill C-3: Some Implications for Anti-Terrorism Policy and
Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” (2008) 42 SCLR 281. Charkaoui is often
discussed as an instance of judicial comparative law, the Court is widely understood to have
described the UK SIAC administrative regime in order to guide the legislature to implement
a similar administrative framework.
179. Supra note 77.
180. Brown v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FCA 130 at paras
71, 72 [Brown].
181. Ibid.
182. Ibid at para 80.

Kaushal, The

Webbing of Public Law 331

constitutional are solved through administrative fairness mechanisms: hearings,
reasons, and opportunities to be heard and to know the case to be met. The
significance of this constellation lies in the role of discretionary decisions, which
are the basis for findings of prematurity and the grounds for articulating the
content of fundamental justice.
B. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: ADMINISTRATIVE SAFEGUARDS

What is often decisive in the constitutional review of deportation is whether the
person received enough administrative fairness. These administrative processes—
which include the remaining stages in the removals process, potential statutory
administrative safeguards, and procedural fairness writ large—play a role in the
review of the decision itself, as well as in prematurity analysis and the principles
of fundamental justice. Their roles differ and sometimes overlap. Heckman has
provided significant precision about these contours.183 In this section, I focus on
the content of administrative safeguards as a powerful example of the webbing.
The courts focus their principles of fundamental justice analyses on “the process
as a whole,” necessarily pivoting from the deportation decision under review to
the broader idea of administrative fairness. This pivot relies upon the entirety
of the deportation process to keep it from overbreadth, arbitrariness, and
disproportionality. There are profound access to justice implications to requiring
deportees to apply for more and different kinds of relief in order to preserve the
fundamental justice of their own deportation.184
As mentioned in Part III(D), above, the phase after the issuance of the
removal order opens into three broad portals of potential appeal, review, and
administrative recourse.185 The first is the possibility of limited internal appeals
of removal orders to the IAD.186 For those deportees who have access to the IAD,
it is the final quasi-judicial adjudication of their claim. The second is judicial
review writ large, which is available for most deportation-related decisions, and
may be accompanied by a stay application. The third set of potential remedies

183. Heckman, supra note 5.
184. In the case of some administrative safeguards, such as H&C applications, deportees must pay
the fees in order to trigger the exercise of discretion.
185. The removal order may be issued by the Minister’s delegate or by the ID. The ID decides
whether to issue a removal order based on a quasi-judicial process. Most permanent
residents and some foreign nationals with more complicated grounds of inadmissibility will
have an ID hearing.
186. This is available only to a small category of people, mostly permanent residents, and not
those with a serious inadmissibility. See IRPA, supra note 43, ss 63-65.
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covers separate processes for entry: H&C applications, PRRAs, and TRPs.187
There is also the possibility of temporary deferral of removal. These decisions are
made by differently positioned decision makers, ranging from tribunal members
to judges to dedicated officers to generalized removals officers. They run the
gamut from judicial to quasi-judicial to wholly discretionary in nature.
The TRP, often referred to as a “minister’s permit,” provides a temporary fix
for inadmissibility.188 TRPs are most often issued to provide exceptional entry
and sometimes residence for foreign nationals who are otherwise inadmissible.
The individual must present a compelling need to enter or remain in Canada.189
Most often, the individual will need to be in Canada for economic or personal
reasons. TRPs carry extra privileges and are not issued as a matter of course.190
Inland applicants who are subject to removal must make written applications
with supporting documents to the case processing centre, which may convoke
an interview. TRP approval is a discretionary decision of an immigration officer.
H&C applications provide equitable relief to applicants who are not
otherwise able to enter or remain in Canada.191 Section 25 permits the Minister
to provide an exemption from a requirement of the IRPA or an inadmissibility
ground based on factors such as settlement, family ties, the best interests of
the children, and hardship.192 The determination is based on documentation
submitted by the applicant, who is entitled to make submissions, although there
is no requirement to conduct an oral interview.193 The guideline criteria for
187. See IRPA, supra note 43, ss 25 (H&C), 112 (PRRA), 24 (TRP).
188. Ibid, s 24.
189. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Temporary resident permits (TRPs)”
(last modified 22 July 2020), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/
immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/operational-bulletinsmanuals/temporary-residents/permits.html>.
190. In terms of extra privileges, TRP holders may apply inland for permits, receive access
to health care, and apply for permanent resident status after three years. An average of
9,537 TRPs were issued per year from 2014 to 2018, the vast number of which were
issued at ports of entry. See Government of Canada, “Annual Reports to Parliament on
Immigration” (2017-2019), online: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada <www.
canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals.html>;
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Evaluation of Temporary Resident Permits”
(November 2016), online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/
reports-statistics/evaluations/temporary-resident-permits-2016.html>. See also Lorenzo v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 37 at para 23 (calling the TRP
“highly discretionary and exceptional in nature”).
191. Kanthasamy, supra note 8.
192. IRPA, supra note 43, s 25.
193. Baker, supra note 163.
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assessing humanitarian and compassionate considerations are detailed, focusing
on establishment and hardship.194 The Minister or their delegate makes the
discretionary decision whether or not to grant the applicant permanent residence
based on their application. However, the H&C application does not stay removal,
so the individual may be removed while they await a decision. Their removal will
sometimes negatively weigh against their establishment and community ties.195
The PRRA has the narrower task of protecting deportees from returning to a
country where their life would be in danger, or they would be at risk.196 It assesses
whether the applicant is in need of protection in Canada in furtherance of Canada’s
international human rights obligations. It is possible to make a PRRA application
only once one is subject to an enforceable removal order.197 As part of the removal
process, the removals officer will typically provide the individual with details for
the PRRA application. Filing the application triggers a stay of removal until the
PRRA decision is rendered.198 The PRRA is a purely administrative review based
on written submissions, although a hearing may be held if a person’s credibility
is in question.199 The review is conducted by designated PRRA officers. In most
circumstances, a successful PRRA entails permanent residence.200
The final administrative safeguard in the panoply is deferral of removal,
which is contained in a small and unassuming statutory provision. IRPA, section
48(2) reads: “If a removal order is enforceable, the foreign national against whom
it was made must leave Canada immediately and the order must be enforced as
soon as possible.”201
This provision has been interpreted to provide the removals officer with
“limited but undefined discretion” to defer removal.202 The decision to defer
removal is a discretionary decision made by a removals officer which temporarily
postpones removal. This discretion includes the travel arrangements for removal,
194. Guide 5291, supra note 105; Kanthasamy, supra note 8 (confirming hardship is not a
standalone test).
195. Removals officers have discretion to wait for the H&C decision.
196. Moretto, supra note 7 at para 8 (“This process seeks to determine whether the removal of
a person to their country of nationality would subject them to a danger of torture…to a
risk to their life or, in certain circumstances, to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment”).
It is concerned with risk determination and therefore plays a much larger role for
unsuccessful refugee claimants than for other deportees.
197. IRPA, supra note 43, s 112(1).
198. IRPR, supra note 44, s 232.
199. IRPA, supra note 43, s 113(b); IRPR, supra note 44, s 167.
200. But see IRPA, supra note 43, s 112(3) (providing an exception for serious inadmissibility).
201. IRPA, supra note 43, s 48(2). This provision used to read “as soon as reasonably practicable.”
202. Varga v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 394 at para 16.
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including timing. The case law has developed the bounds of this discretion.203
As that case law observes, it is “not insignificant” that the grant of discretion,
such as it is, is contained in the same section which imposes the obligation to
execute the removal order.204 As Wang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) notes, “deferral for the mere sake of delay is not in accordance with
the imperatives of the Act.”205 Instead, the Federal Court stated, “the discretion to
defer should logically be exercised only in circumstances where the process to which
deferral is accorded could result in the removal order becoming unenforceable
or ineffective.”206 Counsel will often file a written request to defer removal for
health reasons or in the best interests of the children involved. In Forde v. Canada
(Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) (“Forde”), the Federal
Court cautioned against the overuse of deferral, which erodes public confidence
in the integrity of the immigration system and the rule of law.207 Deferral, then,
is not a standalone administrative safeguard and is arguably carrying much more
weight than it was intended to bear in the statutory framework.
These administrative safety valves are all delegated discretionary decisions
made by administrative (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada or
Canadian Border Services Agency officers) or political (Minister or Minister’s
delegate) decision makers. They are discretionary decisions based primarily on
written submissions. These applicants, at the moment of their application, are
foreign nationals.208 For those of them who are not at risk, the applicable level
of procedural fairness is minimal. Moreover, some of these decision makers have
limited scope. In Revell, Justice De Montigny agreed that the removals officer had
“[a]dmittedly…only limited discretion,” but countered that the Federal Court
“has more leeway than an enforcement officer when considering a request for
a stay” and when reviewing deferral decisions.209 In order to access the greater
“leeway” of the Federal Court, then, the deportee must judicially review the

203. Wang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 148 [Wang]; Lewis
v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 FCA 245; Baron
v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2009 FCA 81; Shpati v
Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FCA 286.
204. Wang, supra note 203 at para 48, cited most recently in Peter v Canada (Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2014 FC 1073 at para 156.
205. Supra note 203 at para 48.
206. Ibid.
207. Forde v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2018 FC
1029 at para 3.
208. IRPA, supra note 43, ss 46-47 (setting out loss of permanent resident status).
209. Revell, supra note 7 at paras 50-51.
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deferral decision, which re-presents the access to justice issue, as well as the
need for haste.
These administrative safeguards operate in both prematurity analysis and
fundamental justice analysis. While the prematurity analysis is prospective,
looking forward to the remaining possible stages before the individual is
deported, the fundamental justice analysis is broader, looking backward to the
procedural fairness that came before the challenged decision and forward to the
remainder of the process. This “process as a whole” or “total context” is then
determined to be in accordance with fundamental justice. 210 How separate are
these administrative processes from deportation? On the one hand, the safeguards
are distinct from the removal process; to initiate them requires a hard turn off of
the deportation road. They are not a necessary part of removal, and one could be
deported without ever initiating any of them. In Moretto’s case, for example, the
H&C application required Moretto to initiate a separate and expensive process
with a different government department.211 The application will not be processed
until the fees are paid, there is no guarantee of processing before removal, and it
may take years to obtain a decision.212 On the other hand, in the background,
these processes are interlocking and co-sustaining in problematic ways. Years ago,
Haigh and Smith remarked that the same Minister who decides a danger opinion
also decides an H&C application.213 More recently, Grey observed that some
decisions may inform one another, using the same underlying factual record,
which repeatedly factors into future assessments and makes upstream findings
in prior decisions difficult to displace.214 Judicial use of administrative safeguards
has not accounted for these nuances.
The common ground between the two sides of administrative safeguards is
that they are not generally intended to save someone from deportation.215 The
administrative process that the courts use to ground deportation’s separation
210. Powell, supra note 94; Stables, supra note 94 at para 56; Torre, supra note 94;
Brar, supra note 94.
211. Moretto, supra note 7. Removal falls under the purview of the CBSA, while H&C
applications fall under the purview of the IRCC.
212. Applicants may request deferral of removal or file an emergency stay application, but these
are not routinely granted. Only foreign nationals may file an H&C application, which means
permanent residents subject to removal may only file between the time their removal order
comes into force (the moment at which they lose status) and their request for deferral of
removal. For someone in Moretto’s position, this period was two weeks long.
213. Supra note 160 at 280.
214. Grey, supra note 5 at 136-37 (referring specifically to connections between findings made at
the IRB and in the PRRA).
215. The exception to this is the PRRA.
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from criminal and penal law and disengagement from constitutional law provides
process protections to guard against mistakes, primarily mistakes of process;
it does not address the nature, consequences, or proportionality of deportation.216
The absurdity created by this webbing is visible in Kreishan, in which the same
individual interests which warranted a hearing at the beginning of the refugee
claim process warranted only a temporary deferral of removal or judicial stay
assessment at its end.

V. SUSTAINING THE CITIZEN/NON-CITIZEN DISTINCTION
This article began with the observation that deportation exists at some remove
from Canadian public law. Its central argument is that this remove is enabled
and sustained by the webbing of public law. The webbing provides a third way
into public law analysis, an opening between public law as legal governance in its
higher register, and public law as judicial doctrine in its lower register. This third
way explains why some legal contexts do not conform to either of those registers.
In the deportation context, the webbing provides a framework for considering
why like things are not treated alike.
The concept of webbing sheds light not only on the relationships between
the individual fields but also on their evolution and thickening over time.
Comparativists regularly draw connections between fields; the difference
in the public law context is that the fields stand together under the umbrella
of a meta-field of law. As fields of law, they are connected by the parties they
co-implicate and the state they co-constitute and delimit. In the context of a
meta-field such as public law, the challenge is to read the cases vertically in light
of the meta-field’s values as much as laterally in light of the mutual referents
across specific fields. Indeed, the webbing in deportation matters belies both
higher-order theoretical values and field-specific doctrinal values. Its thickening
strands suggest that the connective tissue of public law affords a productive view
of legal contexts that traverse public law generally, and a new site for materializing
the citizen/non-citizen distinction in particular.
From a vertical perspective, the webbing is the means by which deportation
law is held below the theoretical values of public law, primarily through its
location on the periphery and in between the doctrinal fields of public law. From
a horizontal perspective, the webbing is the mechanism by which deportation
is shunted towards administrative law. When deportation is characterized as
216. This was argued by the applicant in Revell but dismissed by the Federal Court. See supra
note 7 at para 112.
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non-penal and analogized to individualized sentencing considerations, reduced
to minute calculations of prematurity and engagement, or neutralized by
administrative fairness and statutory administrative safeguards, each judicial
decision may no longer be taken on its own terms. Close examination of the
horizontal webbing reveals overreliance on the field of administrative law.
Administrative law, however, evolved as “a set of common law principles for the
purpose of supervising the regulatory state, ensuring its efficacy, and preventing
arbitrariness.”217 It is concerned with regulation, deputized authority, and fairness.
In contrast, in criminal and constitutional law contexts, the posture of the state
towards the individual is adversarial. Both parties speak in the language of rights,
liberties, and proportionality. By depriving deportees of criminal justice and
constitutional rights protections, the webbing leaves some rights and freedoms of
deportees, such as liberty, security, and freedom from cruel and unusual treatment
or punishment, subject to a lesser law.
The age of migration and deportation presents new challenges for public law.
Many of public law’s core concepts emerged before sovereign statehood, citizenship,
and passports achieved full form. Contemporary public law internalizes the
dissonance presented by non-citizens through various mechanisms. In Canada,
one of those mechanisms is the webbing that this article has described. From both
vertical and horizontal perspectives, this webbing provides the citizen/non-citizen
distinction with juridical form and content. The judiciary relies on various aspects
of the webbing—deportation’s administrative nature, its multi-stage processes
and procedures, and its eleventh-hour safeguards—to legally express the state’s
continued commitment to the citizen/non-citizen distinction.

217. Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (Cambridge
University Press, 2013) at 132.

